Abstract-This paper uses a unique panel data set of an insurer's transactions with repeat customers. Consistent with the asymmetric learning hypothesis that repeated contracting enables sellers to obtain an informational advantage over their rivals, I find that the insurer makes higher profits in transactions with repeat customers who have a good claims history with the insurer, the insurer reduces the price charged to these repeat customers by less than the reduction in expected costs associated with such customers, and repeat customers with bad claim histories are more likely to flee their record by switching to other insurers.
I. Introduction E VER since the seminal work of Akerlof (1970) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) , economic theorists have been paying much attention to the operation of markets characterized by information asymmetries. One type of information asymmetry that has attracted significant attention from economic theorists arises from asymmetric learning, which accompanies repeated contracting between two parties. In such a case, a seller might learn information about its repeat buyers that other potential sellers do not have. When such asymmetric learning takes place, parties may obtain ex post market power and thus make higher profits from repeat customers. This paper uses a unique panel data set to investigate asymmetric learning in repeated contracting.
Theoretical multiperiod models focusing on asymmetric learning in repeated contracting have been developed for a wide range of markets. In a series of influential articles on labor economics, for example, researchers developed models in which current employers are better informed than future potential employers about their employees' ability (see, Waldman, 1984; Greenwald, 1986; Milgrom & Oster, 1987; Ricart i Costa, 1988; and Laing, 1994) . In these models, the stream of job switchers is disproportionately composed of less able workers, switchers' wages are set accordingly, and current employers have some market power over workers whom they (but not other potential employers) recognize as being of high quality.
Another series of asymmetric-learning models focuses on the credit market (see, Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992; Dell'-Ariccia, Friedman, & Marquez, 1999; Marquez, 2002; von Thadden, 2004) . In these models, banks acquire information over time about repeat borrowers that other banks do not have. Such learning gives a bank market power in relation to borrowers whose high quality is known to the bank but not to rival banks. Similarly, asymmetric-learning models have been developed for insurance markets (see Kunreuther & Pauly, 1985; Prendergast, 1992; Nilssen, 2000; de GaridelThoron, 2005) . In these models, insurers learn information over time about their repeat customers that competing insurers lack. This learning about repeat customers gives the informed insurers an information-based competitive advantage over rival insurers.
While the theoretical literature on asymmetric learning is large, substantial empirical testing of asymmetric learning has not developed in parallel. Empirical work on informational asymmetries has focused on asymmetries between buyers and sellers.
1 Relatively little work has been done on asymmetric learning in an environment of repeated contracting. The limited testing of asymmetric-learning models is due at least partly to the unavailability of data that would allow researchers to observe prices, profits, costs, and perceived quality in repeat-contracting situations. For example, to test directly the hypothesized existence of asymmetric learning in labor markets-to test whether an employer can generate higher profits from current employees whose high quality is known to the employer but not to other potential employers-an econometrician would need to have all the information that the employer obtains about any given employee, as well as the profit that the employer makes on the employee in question.
Given the demanding data requirements for direct testing of asymmetric learning in repeated contracting, some empirical studies have used creative but indirect tests. In a well-known article, Gibbons and Katz (1991) found that new employers paid higher wages to employees who were laid off by other firms due to plant closures than to employees who were laid off by firms that had discretion as to whom to lay off. The authors interpret this pattern as consistent with the hypothesis that employers obtain over time private information about their employees and that potential new employers infer from a firm's discretionary decision to lay off an employee that the employee's ability is poor.
2 In addition, consistent with the hypothesis that banks acquire over time information about borrowers that reduces the information asymmetry between them and these borrowers, Petersen and Rajan (1994) found that having a long-term relationship with a bank has a positive effect on the availability of credit.
In the insurance market, D'Arcy and Doherty (1990) showed that consistent with asymmetric learning, profits from various cohorts of policyholders decline as the company's experience with them increases. However, the policyholder cohorts compared may well have been different in aspects other than the policyholder's experience with the company, and the authors lacked the necessary data to control for differences in policyholder characteristics other than company experience. 3 This paper uses a unique panel data set of an insurer operating in the Israeli insurance market to investigate sellers' learning about their repeat customers and their resulting ability to profit from such learning. The data set has several features that make it especially well suited to the investigation of this subject. First, it includes all information that the insurer has about each policyholder, including information relevant to assessing the policyholder's ''quality'' (risk). It also includes full information about the realization of risk in each policy; it thus allows the researcher to observe the insurer's profit from each repeat customer and its relation to what the insurer knows about the customer. In addition, the data set contains information about each policyholder's decision regarding whether to stay with the insurer after the policy term expires. Finally, a notable feature of the Israeli insurance market during the period examined was the lack of systems for information sharing among insurers.
My analysis yields several findings that are consistent with asymmetric learning. First, the insurer makes higher profits from repeat customers, and these higher profits are driven by profits from customers who have good records with the insurer. Furthermore, the longer the customer maintains a good record, the more profits the insurer makes. In the asymmetric-learning model, if a repeat customer with a good claims record with the insurer were to switch to a rival, the rival might be uncertain about the customer's quality. This state of affairs provides the insurer with some information-based market power over customers with a good claim record.
Second, consistent with the asymmetric-learning model, the higher profits coming from repeat customers who have a good claims record are not due to the insurer's charging such customers with higher prices. Rather, these higher profits come from the insurer's providing these customers with a lower reduction in premium than the decrease in costs (payouts of insurance proceeds) associated with these customers. This pattern is stronger when the insurer has more private information about the repeat customers' low risk, for example, when the period during which the customers had no claims against the insurer is long.
Finally, consistent with asymmetric learning and the insurer's possession of private information about repeat customers' risk type, customers with a good claims record during the preceding years tend to stay on for another term. Customers with a bad claims history have an incentive to flee their poor record and pool themselves with customers who leave their insurers due to exogenous shocks. My results with respect to the dependence of switching decisions on company record generalize and extend results obtained in Cohen (2005) , using a subset of my data, concerning the dependence of switching decisions on recent experience with the insurer.
The results of my study highlight the potential significance of systems of information sharing among insurers. As stressed earlier, the Israeli market to which my data pertain had no such information-sharing system during the period under investigation. The desirability of information-pooling systems has been much debated in Europe, where the European Commission has ruled that some systems of information sharing are anticompetitive (de Garidel-Thoron, 2005) . In the United States, some information about accidents is maintained in state records, and it has long been observed (for example, by D' Arcy & Doherty, 1990) , that the publicly available information is highly incomplete and a new insurer cannot adduce from it the complete claims history of other insurers' customers. By providing evidence consistent with asymmetric learning in a market that does not have information pooling among insurers, my analysis suggests that pooling systems may have a significant practical effect. It would be worthwhile for future research to complement the findings of this paper by conducting a similar study in a market that features complete or partial pooling of information among insurers. 4 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the hypotheses that will be tested. Section III describes the data and provides summary statistics. Section IV presents my empirical analysis of the data. Section V concludes.
II. Hypotheses to be Tested

A. The Israeli Automobile Insurance Market
In developing theoretical predictions for testing, it is important to note some important features of the Israeli automobile insurance market in which the insurer whose data I investigate operates.
First, the Israeli automobile insurance market does not have any information sharing among insurers. During the 3 Insurance markets have also been the subject of empirical investigations of types of learning other than the asymmetric learning on which this paper focuses. Studying long-term insurance markets, Hendel and Lizzeri (2003) provide evidence that their structure is influenced by expectations that, over time, symmetric learning will occur, that is, that all market participants will learn the realization of uncertainty surrounding a policyholder's health. In addition, Crawford and Shum (2005) and Israel (2005a Israel ( , 2005b ) study learning by policyholders, who are generally price takers in insurance markets, about the service quality of their insurer. 4 That information-sharing systems have significant practical effects, however, does not tell us whether their effect is positive or negative. Whereas Crocker and Snow (1986) suggested that asymmetric learning is welfare reducing, de Garidel-Thoron (2005) showed that asymmetric learning may have welfare-increasing effects. Although the evidence in this paper does not resolve the debate over whether the lack of informationpooling systems reduces or enhances welfare, it does indicate that the debate is of practical significance.
420
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS period I investigated, there were neither legal requirements to share such information nor privately developed arrangements or practices for such sharing. Second, policyholders who switch to a new insurer are asked to self-report their claims history on the forms that they fill out when getting their new policy. However, new policyholders were not asked by any insurers in the market to document their self-reported claim history (for example, by providing statements from their prior insurer), and it is generally believed in the industry that there is a significant incidence of underreporting of past claims.
5
Third, unlike some other markets, the Israeli automobile insurance market is not heavily regulated. Although every insurance company must submit its schedule of rates to the commissioner of insurance for approval, approval is rarely withheld. In particular, the Israeli commissioner of insurance allows insurers to use a wide range of factors in setting premiums. (The few restricted factors include religion and place of residence.)
Fourth, during the investigation periods, all insurers in the market used deductibles of similar magnitude.
Fifth, in the Israeli insurance market, insurers use only one-period policies in which neither the customer nor the insurer commits to subsequent terms (Kunreuther & Pauly, 1985) . The CEO of the insurer whose data I use indicated that that insurer, as well as rival insurers, did not make and were not bound by either formal or implicit commitments with respect to the terms offered to customers seeking to renew their policy. There is substantial work on the optimal design of policies that commit customers and insurers to a multiperiod contract (Dionne & Lasserre, 1985; Cooper & Hayes, 1987) or that commit the insurer to offer the policyholder subsequent periods of coverage under certain conditions (Dionne & Doherty, 1994; de Garidel-Thoron, 2005) . The Israeli automobile insurance market, however, generally uses only one-period, no-commitment policies such as those modeled in Kunreuther and Pauly (1985) , and this feature of the market should be taken into account in developing predictions for testing.
B. Predictions
When insurers do not share information about their customers' claim record with other insurers, as was the case in the Israeli insurance market during the period that I am studying, asymmetric learning may arise. Observing the realization of a policyholder's risks in a given period enables an insurer to update its prior beliefs concerning the risks posed by the policyholder in a future policy period (Kunreuther & Pauly, 1985; Watt & Vazquez, 1997) . In contrast, a rival insurer to which such a policyholder may consider switching would not be able to observe the policyholder's past claim record and draw inferences from it concerning the policyholder's risk type.
As long as some customers' switching decisions are a product of random shocks (such as changes in workplace or location), a new insurer will not know whether a new customer who self-reports a clean past claim record with another insurer indeed has such a record. Thus, a clean record with a current insurer provides a policyholder and the current insurer with more information than rival insurers have concerning the expected surplus from a transaction. With a clean claim record, the expected surplus to the policyholder and the current insurer increases relative to what it would be with another insurer. Therefore, the policyholder will be better off staying with the current insurer, and the profit of the insurer with this policyholder will increase.
In particular, asymmetric learning in the insurance setting yields three testable predictions: 6 Hypothesis H1: Profits from repeat customers will be higher than from new customers, with the effect being driven by profits from repeat customers who have a good claim history.
Under asymmetric learning, customers with a good claims record know that they would be pooled with some customers who have bad records if they were to switch to a new insurer. Because repeat customers with good claim records would not be able to obtain from a new insurer a price fully reflecting their low risk (which is known to their current insurer), the current insurer will not be required to offer them such a price.
Hypothesis H2: Relative to repeat customers with a bad claims record, repeat customers with a good claims record will be charged lower premiums and generate lower costs, and the reduction in premiums associated with customers who have a good claims record will be lower than the reduction in cost associated with such customers.
Under asymmetric learning, the profits made from repeat customers who have good records are not driven by the insurer's charging them more than new customers. Rather, the profits are due to the current insurer's ability to provide them with a reduction in premium that is lower than the one fully reflecting these customers' low risk.
Hypothesis H3: Customers with a good claims record will disproportionately remain with the same insurer for another period.
5 Cohen (2005) provides evidence of substantial underreporting of past claims by new customers. Self-reporting of past claims is believed to be incomplete also in the U.S. insurance industry (Insurance Research Council, 1991) . 6 In the discussion paper version of this paper (Cohen, 2008) , I present a simple formal model of asymmetric learning that yields a formal statement of these three predictions. The model is an adaptation of the classic models of Greenwald (1986) (which models employers' learning about employees over time) and Sharpe (1990) (which models banks' learning about repeat borrowers over time) to the insurance setting.
Under asymmetric learning, customers with bad claims record, but not customers with good records, will have an incentive to flee their current insurer. Doing so will enable customers with bad records to pool themselves with customers who leave their current insurer due to an exogenous shock.
III. Data and Summary Statistics
A. The Data Set
The data set used in this paper is derived from a comprehensive data set that I obtained from an insurance company that operates in the Israeli automobile insurance market. The data cover the period from November 1994 to December 2001. A subset of the data, comprising information about new customers in their first year, was used by Cohen (2005) to study adverse selection among such customers and by Cohen and Einav (2007) to study risk preferences among these customers. This paper takes advantage of the fact that the data set also includes information about customers who remain with the insurer for more than one period to study the insurer's learning about, and transacting with, such repeat customers.
For each observation (policy), the data set contains information about the policyholder's demographic characteristics (for example, age, gender, education, and marital status), the characteristics of the policyholder's automobile (for example, model year, value of car, size of engine, commercial vehicle or not, main vehicle or not), and characteristics of the policyholder's driving (for example, number of years as a licensed driver, number of claims in the past three years, young driver or not).
The data set also contains information about the terms of the policy. In the Israeli insurance market, policies are largely standard in terms of structure. Two types of deductibles are used: regular and low. I focus on the subset of individuals who chose the regular deductible when joining the insurer; policies with regular deductibles account for 80% of all policies. Since customers rarely change their type of deductible when they renew their policies, these individuals generally kept the regular deductible throughout their dealings with the insurer. It is worth noting that the regular deductible is the higher of the two deductibles used in the Israeli insurance market; accordingly, individuals in the subset of the data on which I focus could not switch to a higher deductible when switching to a rival insurer in order to signal that they are low-risk customers.
In addition to this information, the data set contains information about the realization of risks covered by each policy: the number of claims submitted by the policyholder, the amount of damages reported in each claim, and the payout (actual or expected) paid by the insurer due to each claim. Because some of the claims were rejected by the insurer as nonpayable under the terms of the policy, the number of claims that I use in the analysis that follows is the number of claims that were accepted by the insurer and led to a payment.
Finally, the data set contains information about the period during which each policy was in effect. This information enables calculating the earned premium that the insurer pocketed in cases of policies that were in effect for less than the full policy period.
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I exclude from my data observations from the first three years of the company's operations (November 1994 -December 1997 in which the company might have operated under conditions of imperfect competition. When the company began operating in November 1994, it was the first insurance company in Israel that marketed insurance to consumers directly rather than through agents. The premiums it offered were considerably lower, by roughly 20%, than those offered by other (''conventional'') insurers. However, beginning with the company's third year of operation, the established companies aligned their premiums with the company's, and, beginning in the company's fourth year of operation, additional companies offered direct insurance. Therefore, I focus my analysis on data from 1998 onward. During this period, the insurer had a 7% to 10% share of the Israeli insurance market and, in the view of its CEO, was facing strong competition.
It is worth noting that the profile of new customers whom the company attracted from 1998 to 2001 resembled the profile of new customers it attracted during its first three years of operation. Table 1 provides summary statistics of the covariants for new policyholders in the first six years of operation. It indicates that except for the first year of operations (November 1994 -December 1995 , the composition of new customers in different cohorts is quite similar. Thus, at least from the second year of operation, the company sold policies to a population that was stable in its characteristics. For robustness, however, I checked and found that the results of the analysis are largely the same when I exclude from the examined data individuals who joined the company as new customers in the first year of its operation and remained its customers during the years 1998 to 2001.
In addition to excluding observations from the company's first three years of operation, I also excluded policies that began in 2001, for which I do not have the full realization. This left me with policies issued in three years of operation (1998) (1999) (2000) , which accounts for about 144,000 policies purchased by roughly 89,000 different policyholders. 7 The insurer's earned premium is the quoted annual premium weighted by the exposure time of the policy. Ninety-one percent of the policies had exposure time of more than ten months. In about 1.2% of the cases, policyholders have a claim regarded as a ''total loss'' due to an accident that wrecks the car and produces damages exceeding 70% of the value of the car. In such cases, the insurer discontinued the policy and repaid to the policyholder the prorate fraction of the premium paid but not used. For these cases, I defined the earned premium to equal the quoted annual payment, and I added the fraction of the earned premium repaid by the insurer upon the accident and the discontinuation of the policy to the cost of the accident to the insurer. Table 2 displays summary statistics about the distribution of experience with the company among policyholders in my data set. As the table indicates, 37.6% of policies in the data set were sold to new customers who had no prior experience with the company, 25.3% were sold to policyholders who already had one year of experience, 18% were sold to policyholders who had two years of experience, and 19.1% were sold to policyholders who had been with the company three years or more. Table 3 provides summary statistics about policyholder characteristics at different levels of experience with the company. As one would expect, policyholders with more years of experience with the company are on average somewhat older. The pools of policyholders with different levels of company experience are largely similar in terms of the characteristics of their policies. Table 4 provides summary statistics about policy realization for the set of all policies, the set of policies with a clean company record, and the set of policies without a clean company record, with each set broken into subsets based on the level of company experience. The table shows how these pools differ in terms of earned premium, costs, frequency of claims, and profits. The more experience with the company that policyholders have, the lower the premium earned by the company on their account. The average premium decreases with company experience, declining from 2,520 NIS for policyholders with no experience to 2,118 NIS for policyholders with three years of experience and 2,048 to 2,035 NIS for policyholders with four to five years of experience.
Table 4 also indicates that the average cost to the insurer of a policy (that is, the average amount paid by the insurer to policyholders) also decreases with experience. The average cost per policy declines from 1,687 NIS for policyholders with no company experience to less than 1,238 NIS for policyholders with three or more years of experience.
The relationship between experience and cost is naturally accompanied by a similar pattern with respect to average claim frequency. Claim frequency is substantially lower among pools of policyholders who have more experience with the company. Claim frequency declines from 18.8% among policyholders with no company experience to 15.5% among policyholders with three years of company experience and 14.5% among policyholders with five years of experience. In addition, table 4 provides summary statistics with respect to the profit ratio in each pool of policies. The profit ratio of a pool of policies, which is equal to the average premium minus the average cost divided by average premium, is used by insurance companies to measure the profitability of pool of policies. The table indicates that the profit ratio is higher for the pool of policies with a clean company record (42%) than for the pool of policies with no clean company record (33%). The table also suggests that company experience is much more significant for policies with a clean com- pany record than for policies without such a record: whereas pools of policies with no clean company record do not vary much with company experience, pools of policies with a clean company record vary significantly with company experience. Given these observations, it is unsurprising to find that the profitability of policyholder pools is higher for pools that have more experience with the company. In the insurance market, the profitability of pools of policies is generally assessed using the loss ratio, which is the percentage of aggregate earned premiums that is paid out to policyholders. Its complement is the profit ratio, equal to 1 minus the loss ratio, which is the percentage of aggregate earned premiums that the insurer retains after making all insurance payouts to policyholders. In my data set, the profit ratios are 33% for the pool of policyholders who have no experience with the company, 39% for the pool of policyholders with two years of experience with the insurer, and over 40% for the pool of policyholders who have three or more years of experience with the insurer.
IV. Empirical Analysis
I now turn to the empirical analysis of the data set. First, I examine the relation of profit and the insurer's possession of information (not shared by other insurers) about a policyholder's low risk (section IVA). I then look beyond profits at the two elements that determine these profits, premiums charged and payouts made, and study how each of these elements relates to the insurer's possession of information about a customer's low risk (section IVB). Finally, I study the relation of customers' switching decisions and the insurer's possession of information about a customer's low risk (section IVC).
A. Profits and Insurer's Learning
I start by examining whether the insurer makes higher profits from policies sold to policyholders whom it knows-better than other insurers-to be of low risk. I also ask how the association between profits and company experience is related to the insurer's possession of private information about the policyholder's low risk. To this end, I define a dummy variable labeled Clean Company Record that equals 1 if the insurer has a private company record indicating that the policyholder had no past claims with the insurer.
In particular, I test whether the insurer makes higher profits from repeat customers:
whether these higher profits are driven by transactions with customers who have clean company records:
and whether these profits are highest when the policyholder has had a clean company record for a relatively long period of time:
where Company Experience is the number of years that the policyholder has been with the insurer and Clean Company Record is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the policyholder had no claims during the period that the policyholder has been with the insurer and 0 otherwise. In all the regressions, X refers to a vector of controls that include policyholder characteristics and policyholdervehicle characteristics that were known to the insurer, as well as interactions between Company Experience and Clean Company Record with age, gender, and education.
8 I also control for year fixed effects. For a full description of the covariants used, see the appendix.
In all the specifications run below, I adjust the standard errors for repeat observations of the same policyholder.
I use two measures of profitability. One measure is the Profit Ratio, defined as the ratio of the insurer's profit from selling the policy to earned premium. Earned premium is the premium paid by the policyholder to the insurer, which is equal to the annual premium multiplied by the fraction of the year during which the policy was in effect.
It is worth noting that the standard profitability measure used in the insurance industry is the loss ratio-the ratio of total insurance payouts generated by a given pool of policies to the aggregate earned premiums generated by this pool-which is equal to 1 minus the profit ratio of this pool. Insurers focus on the loss ratio generated by a pool of policies and not on the absolute amount of profits that the pool generates because regulatory requirements limit the amount of insurance coverage the insurer may issue given its capital. Thus, for an insurer to maximize its profits at a given level of capital, it must minimize the loss ratio (or maximize the profit ratio) on its pool of policies.
The other measure of profitability I use is Profit Value, which is equal to the excess of the earned premium of a given policy over payouts (if any) to the policyholder. While this measure of profitability is different from the one used in the insurance industry, it is easy to interpret. Table 5 and 6 present the results of regressions using these two measures of profitability. Table 5 begins by presenting the results of a profit ratio regression. The profit ratio, which is equal to (earned_ premium À costs)/earned_ premium, is censored from above by 1. In 85% of policies, the dependent variable has a value of 1 because the policy generates no claims, and in 15% of policies, the value is below 1. Because the dependent variable is censored from above by 1, tobit regression with an upper limit of 1 is used. The table provides estimates of the conditional marginal effects evaluated around the means of the independent variables.
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In the first regression, displayed in column 1 of table 5, the independent variable of interest is the policyholder's experience with the company. The coefficient of Company Experience is positive and significant at the 1% level. Each additional year of experience with the company increases the insurer's profit ratio by 0.0484, which represents a 14% increase in the average profit ratio.
Of course, sellers' ability to make higher profits from repeat customers may be the result of noninformational switching costs that enable sellers to charge higher prices to customers for whom switching would be costly.
10 Unlike in a model with noninformational switching costs, however, in Asterisks denote the level of statistical significant: * for 0.1; ** for 0.05; *** for 0.01. Standard errors are adjusted by policyholder and are in parentheses. The regressions also control for year dummies and for interactions of Company Experience and Company Clean Record with age, gender, and level of education.
ASYMMETRIC LEARNING IN REPEATED CONTRACTING
the asymmetric-learning model, as explained earlier, what matters for the insurer's ability to make higher profits is not merely company experience but company experience that provides the seller with positive information about the low riskiness of the customer. Therefore, in the regression displayed in column 2 of table 5, I add a dummy variable indicating whether the policyholder has a clean company record. Once this variable is added, Company Experience ceases to be statistically significant, but Clean Company Record is positive and significant at the 1% level. Having a clean company record increases the insurer's profit ratio by 0.1404, which represents a 41% increase in the average profit ratio.
Because the asymmetric-learning model suggests that the extent to which a good claim record is indicative of low risk depends on the length of the period during which the policyholder remained with the insurer and did not have claims, I add to the regressions an interaction term of the Clean Company Record dummy and Company Experience. Column 3 of table 5 displays the results.
Whereas the interpretation of the interaction coefficient between two variables is straightforward in linear models, this is not the case for nonlinear models. To compute the magnitude of the interaction effect in a nonlinear model, one must compute the cross-derivative of the expected value of the dependent variable. The test for the statistical significance of the interaction effect should be based on the estimated cross-partial derivative and not on the coefficient of the interaction term. Because the estimates of the crosspartial derivate provide results that are similar in both significance and magnitude to those obtained without the correction, the results that I present are those obtained by estimating the uncorrected marginal effects of the covariants.
The results indicate that the interaction term is positive and significant at the 1% level. One more year of a company experience without a claim increases the profit ratio by 0.0866, which represents an increase of 25% in the average profit ratio. Clean Company Record by itself also remains positive but it loses its significance and Company Experience turns negative and insignificant.
A specification that uses experience with the company implicitly assumes that each extra year with the company is equally useful in terms of providing the insurer with information about the customer's risk. For a robustness check, I allow for a nonlinear effect of company experience by replacing Company Experience with the log of this variable in the regression in column 4 of table 5. The results remain essentially the same.
In addition, in column 5 of table 5, I use a piecewise specification that allows experience with the company to have a different marginal effect during the first three years of company experience and from this point on. Specifically, I replace Company Experience with two variables: a variable, denoted by Max (Company Experience,3) , that is equal to the maximum of Company Experience and 3, and a second variable, denoted by Min(0, Company Experience À 3), that is equal to the minimum of (Company Experience minus 3) and 0. The regression also includes the interaction terms of Clean Company Record with the two new variables.
The interaction terms of Clean Company Record and the extra experience in the one-to three-year range is positive and significant at the 1% level. The interaction term of Clean Company Record and extra experience beyond three years is insignificant. These results indicate that after a customer accumulates three years of a no-claims history with the insurer, the policyholder's low risk is sufficiently well established that another year or two of no claims with the insurer will not matter much.
11 Table 6 presents the results of profit value regressions. Profit value, which is equal to min(earned premium-costs, earned premium), is again censored from above. In this case, the upper bound is equal to the earned premium of each policy, which varies across individual policies. Again, the profit value is at its upper bound in 85% of policies and below its upper bound in 15% of policies. Since the dependent variable is censored from above and the upper bound varies across observations, I use censored-normal regressions that allow for such a structure.
The results display patterns similar to those obtained in While the results in columns 1 to 5 are consistent in terms of sign and significance with those obtained earlier, their magnitude seems surprisingly large. I therefore examine whether this might be driven by some observations with extreme values. Columns 6 to 10 present results of specifications that attempt to prevent observations with expensive cars from dominating. Because the variable Profit Value takes both negative and positive values, a standard log transformation cannot be used here to reduce weight given to observations with extreme values. I therefore use specifications that replace Profit Value with the cube root of Profit Value, a replacement that operates to reduce the weight given to observations with extreme values.
The coefficients in columns 6 to 10 parallel in terms of sign and significance those in columns 1 to 5, and their magnitude appears reasonable and consistent with the picture emerging out of the summary statistics. For policyholders with a clean company record, an additional year of company experience increases the cube root of Profit Value by 1.87 and thus increase Profit Value by 177 NIS.
B. Premiums, Costs, and Insurer's Learning
Having seen that the insurer makes higher profits on customers with a clean company record, I now turn to examine the two elements that define profits: the premiums (prices) that are charged to customers and the costs (payouts made by the insurer) generated by customers. In particular, I study the relation of each of these elements with the insurer's possession of private information about customers' low risk.
Column 1 in table 7 reports the results of an OLS regression on all individual policies in which the dependent variable is the customer's earned premium. The independent variables of interest, as in the full specification of column 3 of tables 5 and 6, are Company Experience, Clean Company Record, and the interaction of these two variables. In addition to the independent variables of interest, I also control for all the covariants used in tables 5 and 6. The coefficients of both Clean Company Record and the interaction term are negative and significant at the 1% level. Thus, consistent with the asymmetric-learning model, the association of higher profits with the Clean Company Record variable and the interaction variable does not flow from an association of these variables with higher earned premiums.
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Next, I run two regressions that focus on the costs generated by customers-one in which the dependent variable is the cost of the policy to the insurer and one in which the dependent variable is the number of claims generated by the policy. For the cost regression, I use a tobit regression because the dependent variable is censored from below by 0. (Recall that 85% of policies did not result in a claim.) As before, the independent variables of interest are the trio of Clean Company Record, Company Experience, and the interaction of these two variables. I continue to control for policyholder characteristics, vehicle characteristics, and year fixed effects. The results obtained for the costs regressions are shown in columns 2 and 3 of table 7. Column 2 displays the conditional marginal effect, and column 3 shows the unconditional marginal effect.
In both columns 2 and 3, the coefficient of Clean Company Record is negative and significant at the 1% level. Similarly, in both regressions, the coefficient of the interaction term of Clean Company Record and Company Experience is negative and significant at the 1% level. Thus, costs are lower when the insurer has private information suggesting a low risk, and the magnitude of this association is larger when the insurer's private information is based on a longer period of time.
It is instructive to compare the magnitudes of the coefficients of interest in the premium regression in column 1 with their magnitudes in the two cost regressions in columns 2 and 3. While the coefficient of the Clean Company Record dummy is negative in both the premium regression and the two cost regressions, its size is much larger in cost regressions than in the premium regression. Similarly, while the coefficient of the interaction of Clean Company Record and Company Experience is negative in both the premium regression and the two cost regressions, its size is much larger in the two cost regressions than in the premium regression.
The pattern described provides an insight into the source of the association of higher profits with Clean Company Record and with the interaction of Clean Company Record and Company Experience. (See column 3 of tables 5 and 6.) Consistent with the asymmetric-learning model, the insurer gives customers who have clean company records a smaller reduction in premium than would be necessary to fully reflect the lower costs that these customers are expected to generate on the basis of the insurer's private information about their clean company records. Furthermore, the difference between the reduction in expected costs and the reduction in premium charged widens when the insurer has longer experience with a customer who has a clean company record.
As a robustness check, column 4 of table 7 displays the results of a regression in which the dependent variable is the number of claims. As is standard for counting data, I use a negative binomial regression. The independent variables of interests and other controls are the same as in the cost regressions in columns 2 and 3. Consistent with the results of columns 2 and 3, the coefficients of Clean Company Record and of the interaction of Clean Company Record and Company Experience are negative and significant at the 1% level. (Using a Poisson and an OLS regression yields similar results to those obtained using a negative binomial regression.)
C. Insurer Learning and Switching Decisions
Finally, I examine the prediction of the asymmetriclearning model concerning switching decisions. In particular, I now test the model's prediction that customers with clean company records (who are likely to pose lower risks) are more likely to remain with the insurer than customers who lack a clean company record (who are likely to pose higher risks). Cohen (2005) uses a subset of the data set used in this paper and finds that policyholders are more likely to depart at the end of a policy year if they had a claim during that year. Below I examine this issue using the full data set, and I examine the dependence of departure decisions not only on the customer's record in the year preceding the decision but also the policyholder's record with the insurer in preceding years.
Column 5 of table 7 displays the results of a Weibull survival regression. The dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the policyholder elected to leave the insurer at the end of the policy period. In this regression, the key independent variable of interest is Clean Company Record at End of Policy, which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if, at the time the policy ends and the policyholder decides whether to stay with the insurer, the policyholder had no claims during the policyholder's years with the company, including the year just ended, and 0 otherwise. As for controls, I use all the covariants used as controls in tables 5 and 6.
The regression yields results that are consistent with the asymmetric-learning model. The estimated hazard ratio of Clean Company Record at End of Policy is significant at the 1% level and equal to 0.314, indicating that policyholders with clean company records at the end of the policy have a 12 The adjusted R 2 in this regression is low because of the use of the earned premium as a dependent variable. In a regression with the same independent variables and the annual premium as the dependent variable, the adjusted R 2 is about 0.8. While the annual premium quoted to the policyholder is a function of the policyholder's characteristics, the earned premium is a product of the annual premium and the exposure time. While 90% of policies have an exposure time of eleven to twelve months, about 10% are in effect for shorter-often much shorter-periods due to cancellation by policyholders. Because such reductions in exposure time are often due to random factors that are not deterministic products of policyholder characteristics, they considerably reduce the adjusted R 2 of the earned premium regression. For example, in the regression in column 1, if the dependent variable is the annual premium rather than the earned premium, the sign and the significance of the coefficients of interest remain the same. In table 7, I display a regression with earned premiums as the dependent variable because the insurer's profits are defined by the earned premium rather than by the annual premium.
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THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 68% lower hazard of leaving the insurer and therefore remain with the insurer for substantially longer periods. Another regression that I run separates the Clean Company Record at End of Policy dummy into two components: Clean Company Record in Policy Year, which indicates whether the policyholder filed no claims during the policy period just ended, and Clean Company Record in Prior Years, which indicates whether the policyholder filed no claims to the company in the years preceding the policy year just ended. Column 6 in table 7 displays the results of the estimated hazard ration of a Weibull survival regression.
As expected, the coefficients of both the Clean Company Record in Policy Year dummy and the Clean Company Record in Prior Years dummy are smaller than 1 and significant at the 1% level, indicating that both not having a claim during the policy period and not having a claim in prior years are associated with a higher probability of staying with the company for another year. Not having claims during the just-ended policy year reduces the hazard of leaving the insurer by 24.5%, and having a clean past record in prior years reduces the probability of departure by 73.5%.
The results suggest that a clean record with the insurer strongly affects how long a policyholder will remain with his or her insurer and that the decision about whether to leave or stay depends on the full record that the insurer has, and not just on the current-year record. Obtaining information about the claim record of a customer during either the policy year just ended or prior years provides the insurer with private information about the customer's risk. Consistent with the asymmetric-learning story, we find that the insurer's possession of private information indicating a policyholder is of high risk (giving the policyholder an incentive to flee the insurer by switching) is associated with an increase in the probability of the policyholder's departure.
V. Conclusion
This paper uses a unique and rich panel data set obtained from an insurance company to test empirically the existence of asymmetric learning in insurance markets with repeated contracting and no sharing of information among insurers. Consistent with the predictions of the asymmetric-learning theory, I find that (1) the insurer makes higher profits on policies it sells to its repeat customers, (2) these profits are driven by profits from repeat customers who have a clean record with the insurer, (3) these profits are generated not merely by charging these customers higher premiums but rather by the lower costs that clean record policyholders impose on the company and by the insurer's not providing these policyholders with a discount that fully reflects their low risk, and (4) the high quality of the pool of repeat customers' policies is a result of the stronger tendency of customers with bad records to flee their bad record by leaving the insurer. These findings may be useful to future work on asymmetric learning in repeated contracting.
